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HomeMy WebLinkAboutPEC140011 VVMC Public Comment TC 021715Price of refusal - AOPA News and Video > All News > Price of refusal Price of refusal Helicopter EMS, and the pressure to fly 638 2 January 15, 2015 By Jim Moore Page 1 of 6 An emergency medical services helicopter pilot fired in 2013 after refusing to fly with an inoperative emergency locator transmitter, and subsequently reporting the discipline that followed that refusal to the FAA, is among few aviators who have won the first round in a process created to provide federal protection for whistleblowers. The case of this Ohio -based pilot is not the first in recent months to illustrate the pressure placed on pilots, and the penalties that can be imposed for refusing a mission. It is the most http: / /www. aopa. orgINews- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January / l 5lPrice -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Price of refusal - AOPA Page 2 of 6 recent example of federal intervention in and scrutiny of an air ambulance industry that has faced safety concerns amidst rapid growth in recent years. The FAA, announcing new rules governing procedures and risk management in February 2014, noted that 2008 was the deadliest year on record for air ambulances, with 21 lives lost in five accidents. Between 2011 and 2013, there were seven air ambulance accidents resulting in 19 fatalities; all other commercial helicopter operations resulted in the same number of accidents and 20 fatalities. Pressure to fly and complete missions has been a significant factor as the industry has grown, and is not limited to for - profit operators. The NTSB cited what it called a "punitive culture and inadequate safety management" by the Alaska Department of Public Safety in its report in November about a fatal 2013 crash. The board found that the pilot's "exceptionally high motivation to complete search and rescue missions" increased his tolerance for risk, which played a role in the decision to launch the ill -fated flight in marginal conditions. Most air ambulances are flown by private companies rather than public agencies, and operate under Part 135, with strict requirements including weather minimums. As the industry has grown (the FAA noted in early 2014 that 75 air ambulance companies operate 1,515 helicopters), operators have also ramped up efforts to control risk and increase safety. "EMS has had a horrible safety record over the last 10 years," said Kurt Williams, president of the National EMS Pilots Association, "All related to the culture of various programs." The National EMS Pilots Association recently launched a new program, Cultural Health and Mitigation Program for Safety, or CHAMPS, that aims to address that through surveys and data analysis that will allow individual operators to compare their procedures, and safety culture, to the rest of the industry. Williams said there has been improvement in recent years, and most if not all operators have policies and procedures designed to allow pilots to make decisions about accepting a mission without regard to the nature of that mission. In most cases, if not all, an air ambulance pilot is not given any details about the nature of the call, Williams said, and company policies generally shield pilots from pressure that can come from competition with other providers and the business ramifications. http: / /www. aopa. orgINews- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January / l 5lPrice -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Price of refusal - AOPA Page 3 of 6 "We're constantly trying to take that pressure to fly out of the equation," said Williams, who was interviewed prior to the recent OSHA ruling against Air Methods Corp., the nation's largest private provider of air medical transport. A redacted report on the OSHA investigation obtained by AOPA details the decisions made by one pilot who opted to ground his helicopter and refuse a call because the ELT was not operating in July 2013. The problem had caused a previous mission to abort, and mechanics had documented the ELT failure and their inability to resolve it. The pilot had consulted with a colleague (whose job title was redacted in the document provided to AOPA) who agreed that flying over mountainous terrain in Ohio and West Virginia without a functioning ELT posed unacceptable risk. After the pilot refused a dispatch to a medical emergency in Rio Grande, Ohio, the pilot was placed on administrative leave, though the Air Methods Governing Operation Manual gives the pilot in command final authority to make such decisions; under federal regulations, "the pilot's authority to decline to fly is also supreme," OSHA noted in its report. The pilot was fired four days after calling the FAA on Aug. 1, 2013, to report concerns about the malfunctioning ELT. "Respondent's termination letter to Complainant failed to mention any misconduct other than Complainant's refusal to fly the aircraft and that [redacted] tarnished the relationship they had with their client," the report states. OSHA ordered the company to reinstate the pilot, with back pay of $158,032, with another $9,877 due per month until the pilot is rehired. OSHA also ordered compensation for lost benefits, and $6,000 for "emotional stress suffered by Complainant" and $2,500 to compensate the pilot for penalties incurred when retirement savings were tapped to support the pilot's family. Air Methods, in a written statement from Mike Allen, president of domestic air medical services, disputed the OSHA findings. "We disagree with the decision, and at this time, Air Methods is exploring its rights to appeal the decision," Allen wrote. "Safety is and always will be our highest priority, and we continue to raise the bar to ensure the safe return of our crews and patients to their loved ones." http: / /www. aopa. orgINews- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January / l 5lPrice -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Price of refusal - AOPA Page 4 of 6 Air Methods, based in Englewood, Colorado, operates a fleet of 450 aircraft, most of them helicopters, out of 300 bases in 48 states, according to the company website. It has grown from a single base established in 1980 to a company that transports more than 100,000 patients a year, generating $1.8 billion in revenue, according to investment analysts who monitor the company's financials. "In 2013, Air Methods became the first air medical provider and helicopter operator to achieve the highest level (Level 4) within the FAA's voluntary Safety Management System (SMS) program," Allen continued. "By earning Level 4 status, we continue to actively pursue and invest in technology, systems and training, all while encouraging a culture of compliance. We also have strict policies and procedures in place to ensure our crews are empowered to make the day -to -day decisions, individually, to do the right thing, to make a difference, and to be the strongest link in the performance of our individual duties." The recent OSHA case is not the first time Air Methods has run afoul of federal regulators: The FAA proposed a $428,000 civil penalty in July 2014 for failing to inspect night vision systems. Another employee filed suit in 2012, claiming he was wrongfully terminated for reporting safety violations. The more recent whistleblower case could wind up in federal court as well. It is already unusual in that OSHA has sided with the pilot who was fired. The Wendell H. Fort Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21 st Century, more conveniently known as AIR 21, was written in 1999, two years after a Continental Express flight crashed, killing all 14 aboard. That crash was attributed to the failure of maintenance crews to replace screws on the horizontal stabilizer. The NTSB said the airline management's failure to establish an appropriate safety culture contributed to the crash. AIR 21 was one of several industry- specific federal laws created to protect whistleblowers who report violations to federal regulators. Only 4 percent of the 686 cases filed in the past decade have been found to have merit upon initial review by OSHA, the first step in the process. About 80 percent have been dismissed or withdrawn; the rest have been settled, according to federal data. Attorney Doug Hall of the Altanta law firm FordHarrison represents employers in whistleblower cases (though he and the firm are not involved in the Air Methods case), and said that the AIR 21 legislation and adjudication process heavily favors employees over http: / /www.aopa.org/News- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January /15 /Price -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Price of refusal - AOPA Page 5 of 6 employers, and despite an uptick in recent years in the number of such cases, the relatively low number of whistleblower protection cases reflects the industry's commitment to safety. "No one wants unsafe operations out there," Hall said. "I think that's probably a big factor as to why most of these cases have not been found to have merit." Hall said a distinction must be made between pilots refusing missions based on actual or potential violations of federal regulations, and pilots who refuse because they are uncomfortable with the circumstances. He said he knew nothing about the recent Air Methods case that was not included in the OSHA press release, and "you have to figure there's another side to the story." That other side may come out in detail as the case proceeds, assuming that Air Methods invokes its right to appeal the OSHA decision to an administrative law judge, a process that would include hearing the entire case again in an adversarial proceeding, with each side presenting its case in detail. Either side can appeal a decision at that level to an administrative review board, and ultimately to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Jim Moore I Online Associate Editor, AOPA AOPA Online Associate Editor Jim Moore joined AOPA in 2011 and is an instrument -rated private pilot who enjoys competition aerobatics. 638 2 30 Topics Aviation Industry, Search and Rescue, Government Agencies, FAA, NTSB, ELT, Gear News from Headquarters Aircraft Spotlight Safety One of the things common in The Cessna 150 has been You and your fellow flying people who restore things — used to teach pilots to fly for club members are trained to aircraft, automobiles, or decades and is still going handle in- flight emergencies, http: / /www. aopa. orgINews- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January / l 5lPrice -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Price of refusal - AOPA antiques – is a love for the strong. It is durable, simple process of breathing new life to fly to and inexpensive to into a dream forgotten years operate. It may not be fancy, ago. AOPA Flying Club but most pilots have a soft Manager Kelby Ferwerda spot for this reliable little talks about how restoring his trainer. Pocono Mountains 50 -year old BMW motorcycle Flying Club President Paul is similar to reigniting the Houle shares how his club is spark in pilots who's flying creating new pilots with the has lapsed. Learn more venerable Cessna 150. about how your flying club could host a Rusty Pilot Clinic to get pilots back in the cockpit and possibly generate new members for your club. Page 6 of 6 but are you prepared to endure a forced landing? Of the millions of GA flights every year, only a few end with unplanned off - airport landings. Even though the odds of a crash are slim, the potential consequences are harsh —which is why you should prepare and take basic precautions. To help, the AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) offers a video, publication, seminar, and web page of resources dedicated to this topic. http: / /www. aopa. orgINews- and - Video /All- News /2015 /January / l 5lPrice -of- refusal ?WT.... 02/18/2015 Warren Campbell From: Doris Kirchner <kirchner @vvmc.com> Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2015 9:32 AM To: George Ruther Subject: FW: Vail Town Council Tonight George, I am passing the email along to you and you may share with the Council members if you deem appropriate. It is from Jeff Shroll, who is a Board member on the VVMC Board. Thank you. My best, Doris Doris J. Kirchner President and CEO Vail Valley Medical Center Phone. 970 - 477 -5187 Our Mission: Vail Valley Medical Center will provide superior health services with compassion and exceptional outcomes. From: Jeff Shroll [ma i Ito: Jeff(aJownofGypsu m. com] Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2015 11:47 AM To: Doris Kirchner Subject: Re: Vail Town Council Tonight Doris, Feel free to share this however might be helpful. When asked about noise several years ago about the countless helicopter missions that fly over the Town of Gypsum annually due to the HAATS training facility being located in our Town limits, the best response I can remember was from that of our Mayor, "That sound my friend is the sound of freedom. We are okay with that ". If I were to live in the Town limits of Vail and heard the Medical copter coming in our out "that sound my friend is sound of someone's life being saved and I can live with that ". It is infrequent and flight for life like the military does not just fly around wasting fuel for no reason, they truly are trying to make a difference in someone's life. Our heli base trains NATO allies from all over the world for high altitude flying and we have not worried a half a second about those soldiers crashing a helicopter. Many of the medical pilots today are trained former military pilots and some of the best in the world. I watched one land a craft at 13,000ft. Last summer on Mt. Yale and take one of my cross country kids to medical help. While I was not happy about the circumstances by which they came, the fact they could come saved of one my athlete's lives. Very Truly Yours, Jeff Shroll, ICMA -CM Town Manager, Town of Gypsum A Home Rule Municipal Corporation P.O. Box 130 50 Lundgren Blvd Gypsum, Colorado 81637 (970) -524 -7514 (970) - 524 -7522 (fax) Jeff @townofgvpsum.com www.townofgvpsum.com Warren Campbell From: Mayer, Kathleen <KathleenMayer @Centura.Org> Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2015 5:02 PM To: Ronald J. Snow Cc: Kate Curtis (katercurtis @gmail.com); Strate, Leslie; mervlapin @hotmail.com; lamontvail @yahoo.com; George Ruther; gary.w.dahlen @earthlink.net; bhardin113 @gmail.com; Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb @aol.com); Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cjc @cjclayman.com); Richard Kent; kirchner @vvmc.com Subject: RE: Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail Importance: High Mr. Snow and those copied above, I'm responding to your email below, and regret that I wasn't able to do so earlier. Due to the extensive nature of our chief pilot's investigation into your claims, including interviewing our pilot and our medical crewmembers on board that flight, it's taken a while to assemble the information. Hopefully this email reaches you in time for consideration at your meeting this evening. Our flight on February 8th, 2015 into and from the Vail helipad next to 170 was conducted in accordance with FAA regulations and our operating procedures for that helipad. On departure, our pilot lifted from the helipad with an extremely critical patient on board, departed to the west toward Eagle and above descending terrain over 170, gaining altitude before turning eastbound to head toward the receiving hospital in Denver. Our choice to fly over 170 itself is safety related, as the median is a potential landing zone should we have a loss of power —and a much better one than the congested area with hotels and homes that you describe. The pilot did not overfly those areas. As for the references by Colonel Dahlen to out of ground effect and the transition from in ground effect on departing the helipad, that is factored into every one of our flights with the requisite 10% safety margin required by our helicopter service provider. That transition is common to every kind of powered vehicle that flies, whether airplane, helicopter, or tilt rotor. His suggestion to relocate the helipad to the Eagle County Airport would extend the patient's out of hospital time by at least 40 minutes, requires that the Eagle County Paramedic Service be available for a round trip transport, and is subject to traffic and road conditions that could significantly extend that travel time —as well as taking the patient in the opposite direction of the hospital where his /her care is to be provided in Denver. ( The distance between the airport and Vail Valley Medical Center is actually 40 miles, and substantially more than a "20 minute trip" at normal highway speeds. ) Re the reference to fuel, our helicopters are required by the FAA to carry a 20 minute reserve, and by our provider to carry a 30 minute reserve. Our helicopters have more than adequate power to carry the required fuel for flights into the Vail Valley, whether we're required to hover out of ground effect on a ski slope, or landing and departing from the Vail helipad. In our chief pilot's history of more than 20 years flying into and from the Vail Valley, we have not damaged property or an aircraft, nor have we received any notice of violation from the FAA, the agency charged with enforcing the regulations. Safety —for our crewmembers, our patients and the public —is our top priority and is lived out in our program every day. Finally, your statement that our program would compromise a critical patient's care by engaging in a sightseeing excursion is unfortunate, and uninformed. Our flight time recorded for that flight demonstrates that it was carried out with commitment to the shortest out of hospital time possible for our patient, and with the appropriate safety procedures as agreed upon, in place. Respectfully, KM Kathleen Mayer, MS RN Program Director Flight For Life Colorado 720 321 3920 Office 303 589 7889 Cell 720 321 3915 Fax St. Anthony Hospital 11600 West 2nd Pl. Lakewood, CO 80228 kathleenmaver(@centura.orLy flightforlifecolorado.org Flight For We Colorado r °fit Accredited since 1993 From: Ronald J. Snow [mailto:rsnow @burlesonllp.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 10:30 AM To: Mayer, Kathleen Cc: Kate Curtis (katercurtis @gmail.com); Strate, Leslie; mervlapin @hotmail.com; lamontvail @yahoo.com; GRuther @vailgov.com; gary.w.dahlen @earthlink.net; bhardin113 @gmail.com; Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb @aol.com); Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cjc @cjclayman.com); Richard Kent; Deborah and Joe Morris - Prapoulenis Subject: Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail Kathy, I am distraught and disappointed to have to return to you and report that your helicopters still ignore the most basic FAA prohibition against flying over residential areas. Despite your efforts to control the situation and assurances that dangerous flights would cease, I personally witnessed an orange FFL helicopter depart the temporary emergency helipad located alongside 1 -70 in Vail on Sunday afternoon, February 8, 2015. The flight occurred at 3:15 PM, local MST time on a beautiful, cloudless, almost windless day. The helicopter departed the helipad and proceeded south over the medical center campus which is adjacent to the highly populated Evergreen Lodge and Skaal Hus condominiums. Upon arriving at Gore Creek, the helicopter turned and proceeded Easterly above many single family residences, and adjacent to the Alphorn Condominiums, the Four Seasons, the Sonenalp, the Sabastian, the Solaris and the many other high density residential buildings and high density gathering places that make up the center of the Town. I am sure that the pilot and his passengers enjoyed the sightseeing excursion over the World Ski Cup sites and the highest numbers of tourists to ever visit Vail. How exhilarating! Even if in total disregard of your instructions to your pilots and the most fundamental FAA safety regulations. Ronald J. Snow 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 1300 Denver, CO 80203 Direct: 303.801.3248 Main: 303.801.3200 Fax: 303.801.3201 Email: rsnow .burlesonllp.com This message is intended to be CONFIDENTIAL and may contain PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY- CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS. ********************************************** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** This communication is for the use of the intended recipient only. It may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, any disclosure, copying, further distribution or use thereof is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please advise me by return e -mail or by telephone and delete /destroy it. ********************************************** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** Warren Campbell From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Good Afternoon Ron- George Ruther Thursday, February 12, 2015 3:23 PM 'Ronald J. Snow'; Council Dist List 'Kate Curtis (katercurtis @gmail.com)'; 'Strate, Leslie'; 'mervlapin @hotmail.com'; 'lamontvail @yahoo.com'; 'gary.w.dahlen @earthlink.net'; 'bhardin113 @gmail.com'; 'Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb @aol.com)'; 'Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cjc @cjclayman.com)'; 'Richard Kent'; 'Deborah and Joe Morris - Prapoulenis'; 'Kathleen Mayer (kathleenmayer @centura.org)'; 'Doris Kirchner (kirchner @vvmc.com)'; 'Ray Stanton (Ray@ RESAviation.com)' RE: VVMC. Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail I am charged with facilitating the review process involving the proposed emergency helicopter landing pad on the VVMC campus. As such, I want to make certain we get it right. As you are aware, the Town has retained helicopter flight safety consulting services. The purpose of doing so is to evaluate and make recommendations in response to the proposal. In your email message you allege certain FAA and other safety violations or non compliance. I would like to ask the Town's consult to investigate these allegations more closely. Again, we want to get this right. To do so, however, I need to ask you to be more specific? What exactly are you referring to? The sooner I get this information the quicker the Town can respond. I look forward to you getting back with me. Regards, George Ruther, AICP Director Community Development TOWN OF AMPENIV KN UAIt ia oi VAIL , BEAVER CREEK 970.479.2145 970.376.2675 cell www.vailgov.com www.twitter.com /vailgov From: Ronald J. Snow [mailto:rsnow @burlesonllp.com] Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 3:13 PM To: Council Dist List Cc: Kate Curtis (katercurtis @gmail.com); Strate, Leslie; mervlapin @hotmail.com; lamontvail @yahoo.com; George Ruther; gary.w.dahlen @earthlink.net; bhardin113 @gmail.com; Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb @aol.com); Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cjc @cjclayman.com); Richard Kent; Deborah and Joe Morris - Prapoulenis; Kathleen Mayer (kathleenmayer @centura.org) Subject: VVMC. Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail Ladies and Gentlemen: You should be aware that the helicopter services which utilize the Town's emergency helipad are abusing the privilege in total disregard of FAA regulations and instructions of the Flight For Life Director of Flight Operations, Ms. Kathleen Mayer, and the other medical helicopter services which she has contacted in an effort to control this situation. Attached is a copy of my email to Ms. Mayer informing her of this unfortunate situation. This offense occurred just over a week after the most recent fatal helicopter incident in Erie, Colorado. If you are not aware of the risks of helicopter operations, you must inform yourselves before making any decision on the VVMC Master Plan application. As you consider the request from VVMC to place a helipad on its campus, please consider that the operators have and will continue to violate all regulations and safety concerns without any justification. If you allow helicopter service on the VVMC campus, you invite the dangers of helicopter operations into highly populated residential areas and places of public accommodation. Any effort by the FAA, the Town of Vail, Flight for Life or anyone else to enforce helicopter flight paths will continue to be disregarded. Moreover, the flight paths proposed by the VVMC Master Plan application are inherently unsafe and in violation of FAA standards. The FAA will not make a land use decision and will not override your decision. If you decide to allow a helipad in violation of the FAA standards, the risk and fault and liability lies with you as individuals. Ronald J. Snow 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 1300 Denver, CO 80203 Direct: 303.801.3248 Main: 303.801.3200 Fax: 303.801.3201 Email: rsnow(a)_burlesonllp.com From: Ronald J. Snow Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 10:30 AM To: Kathleen Mayer (kathleenmayer@centura.org) Cc: Kate Curtis (katercurtis(cgmail.com); ' Strate, Leslie'; 'mervlapin @hotmail.com'; 'lamontvail @yahoo.com'; GRuther@vailgov.com; gary.w.dahlen@earthlink.net; 'bhardin113 @gmail.com'; Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb@aol.com); Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cic a cjclayman.com); Richard Kent; Deborah and Joe Morris - Prapoulenis Subject: Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail Kathy, I am distraught and disappointed to have to return to you and report that your helicopters still ignore the most basic FAA prohibition against flying over residential areas. Despite your efforts to control the situation and assurances that dangerous flights would cease, I personally witnessed an orange FFL helicopter depart the temporary emergency helipad located alongside 1 -70 in Vail on Sunday afternoon, February 8, 2015. The flight occurred at 3:15 PM, local MST time on a beautiful, cloudless, almost windless day. The helicopter departed the helipad and proceeded south over the medical center campus which is adjacent to the highly populated Evergreen Lodge and Skaal Hus condominiums. Upon arriving at Gore Creek, the helicopter turned and proceeded Easterly above many single family residences, and adjacent to the Alphorn Condominiums, the Four Seasons, the Sonenalp, the Sabastian, the Solaris and the many other high density residential buildings and high density gathering places that make up the center of the Town. I am sure that the pilot and his passengers enjoyed the sightseeing excursion over the World Ski Cup sites and the highest numbers of tourists to ever visit Vail. How exhilarating! Even if in total disregard of your instructions to your pilots and the most fundamental FAA safety regulations. Ronald J. Snow 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 1300 Denver, CO 80203 Direct: 303.801.3248 Main: 303.801.3200 Fax: 303.801.3201 Email: rsnow @burlesonllp.com This message is intended to be CONFIDENTIAL and may contain PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY- CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS. Warren Campbell From: Gary W Dahlen <gary.w.dahlen @earthlink.net> Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 12:31 PM To: George Ruther Cc: Kathleen Mayer (kathleenmayer @centura.org); Kate Curtis (katercurtis @gmail.com); Strate, Leslie; Mery Lapin; James Lamont; William Hardin; Betsy Bowling (rpmbbbb @aol.com); Caryn J. Clayman, Esq. (cjc @cjclayman.com); Richard Kent; Deborah and Joe Morris - Prapoulenis; Ronald Snow Subject: Re: Flight fo Life continues disregard of FAA safety regulations to fly over center of Vail George -- I have written you, the Vail Town Council and the Planning Commission several times about the VVMC Master Plan and the helicopter landing pad issue. No one disputes the occasional positive impact helicopter operations have on truly extreme trauma cases. Likewise, no one can dismiss the danger helicopter operations at high altitude pose to the crew, patients, and the residents in the surrounding populated areas. In the case of the VVMC, the hospital is not a Level One or Two Trauma Center. It is located in an area of dense buildings and and a large populated area. Aerodynamic physics and dynamics of flight at high altitude are not being taken into account in your recent deliberations. The loss of ground effect when the helicopter moves off the proposed pad increases the already risky flight operations at altitude. The margin for safe flight operations at the Vail altitude is extremely small, especially for helicopters loaded with a full crew, patient and large fuel reserves required for mountain flying. Recent medical helicopter flights have disregarded agreements already in place (see below) and only serve to alert the local residents of a situation that could have grave consequences in the future. I urge the Town Council and the Planning Commission to reconsider relocating the helicopter landing location to the Eagle County Airport that has 360 safe degree ingress /egress for helicopter operations, full real -time weather support, and effective fire fighting resources. A twenty minute ambulance ride is a proper trade for the increased safety afforded to the patients, the crew of the helicopter, and certainly the nearby residents to the VVMC. A "nice to have" capability is not enough justification to endanger the nearby neighborhood. Not responding to valid citizen input on the issue of known safety of flight issues puts the Town, the VVMC and individual Council members in an precarious legal position of purposeful disregard of identified safety issues, and puts the Town and Council personally and collectively in legal jeopardy. I urge the Town Council to deny the helicopter lading facility at the VVMC and relocate it to the Eagle County Airport. Please pass this request to the Town Council for their action. Gary W Dahlen, Colonel, USAF (Retired) Scorpio Condominium Owner gary.w.dahlengearthlink.net (719)685 -4711 (719)205 -4593 Cell On Feb 11, 2015, at 10:30 AM, Ronald J. Snow wrote: Kathy, I am distraught and disappointed to have to return to you and report that your helicopters still ignore the most basic FAA prohibition against flying over residential areas. Despite your efforts to control the situation and assurances that dangerous flights would cease, I personally witnessed an orange FFL helicopter depart the temporary emergency helipad located alongside 1 -70 in Vail on Sunday afternoon, February 8, 2015. The flight occurred at 3:15 PM, local MST time on a beautiful, cloudless, almost windless day. The helicopter departed the helipad and proceeded south over the medical center campus which is adjacent to the highly populated Evergreen Lodge and Skaal Hus condominiums. Upon arriving at Gore Creek, the helicopter turned and proceeded Easterly above many single family residences, and adjacent to the Alphorn Condominiums, the Four Seasons, the Sonenalp, the Sabastian, the Solaris and the many other high density residential buildings and high density gathering places that make up the center of the Town. I am sure that the pilot and his passengers enjoyed the sightseeing excursion over the World Ski Cup sites and the highest numbers of tourists to ever visit Vail. How exhilarating! Even if in total disregard of your instructions to your pilots and the most fundamental FAA safety regulations. Ronald J. Snow 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 1300 Denver, CO 80203 Direct: 303.801.3248 Main: 303.801.3200 Fax: 303.801.3201 Email: rsnow(o)_burlesonllp.com This message is intended to be CONFIDENTIAL and may contain PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY- CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS. Warren Campbell From: Patty McKenny Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 10:39 AM To: George Ruther Subject: FW: VVMC Helipad Hi George, Public input below: Patty McKenny Town Clerk pmckenny(@vailgov.com 479 -2136 From: Eileen Jacobs [mailto:manager @ mountaincaretaker.com] Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 5:53 PM To: Council Dist List Subject: VVMC Helipad Dear Vail Town Council, Although I do not live in Vail, my husband and I have managed Scorpio and Alphorn Condominiums for over 25 years and the welfare of the owners there is very near and dear to us! We have followed the VVMC development, specifically with regard to the helipad. I worked in the Pan Am Building in New York City in 1977 when they regularly landed helicopters in mid -town Manhattan. In May of that year, I vividly remember the helicopter crash that I believe caused them to cease all flights into the area as it was simply too dangerous. I worked on the 39th floor and a helicopter blade sliced through the window and desk on the 36th floor. I'll never forget looking up from the ground outside at that blade sticking out the window. Five people were killed including one on the ground. http: / /nycl977.blogspot.com/ 2006 /10/5- killed -as- copter -on- pan- am- building.htLnl httDs: / /www.eooele.com/ search ?a = pan +am +helicopter+ crash &esr)v= 2 &biw= 1920& bih = 955 &tbm= isch &imeiI= siOEsvf8 46T8M% 253A% 253BOTv9F9gokamMrM% 253Bhttps% 25253A% 25252F% 25252Fwww .flickr.com %25252Fphotos %25252 F20976994% 25254ON06 %25252F2138403138 %25252F& source= iu &pf =m &fir= slOEsyf8g46T8M %253A %252COTv9F9gok amMrM %252C &usg= JncpJf6CgBsAdOn6GFFtp vTNg8% 3D& dpr= 1& ved= OCDIQyIc &ei= 6PXbVOfAD4gvggSculHIBA #im gdii= & imgrc= siOEsyf8g46T8M %253A %3BOTv9F9gokamMrM% 3Bhttps% 253A% 252F% 252Fc1.staticflickr.com %252F3 %2 52F2171 %252F2138403138 b3654655a5.ipe% 3Bhttps% 253A% 252F% 252Fwww. flickr .com %252Fphotos %252F20976994 %2540N 06 %252 F2138403138 %252 F %3 B500 %38350 To compromise the safety and well -being of many to shave a few minutes time off transport of an injured person who already has medical attention for immediate care just doesn't make sense by the numbers. 56eeam f4ca4, CMCA* Mountain Caretaker, Inc. P.O. Box 1093 960 Chambers Ave., #13203 Eagle, CO 81631 (970)328 -6226 *Certified Manager of Community Associations Broker Associate, Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices Contact. realestate @mountaincaretaker.com 1 To: Mayor and Council Town of Vail Colorado Fr: Covell D. Brown 121 West Meadow Drive Apt 305 Vail, Colorado February 15, 2015 Subject: Inherent risks in dealing with higher order decisions Dear Mr. Mayor and Council, After a good deal of patient, objective thought about the proposed Helicopter airport that the local hospital is requesting permission to build and operate, I have put my professional hat on and now offer to you the following thoughts and analysis for your consideration and possible use. While a local resident, I am not writing in that capacity today. Rather, as I have for senior level clients nationally and internationally, I here offer my best effort at an objective insight into the decision you face. As I understand local municipal history, the decisions you and your predecessors have been called upon to make, in general, relate to land use and the resolution of competing interests (e.g. between the Town and a private developer or between different developers.) As well, you govern a wide range of municipal activities; infrastructure, bylaws, services and related matters. You and your predecessors have demonstrated a high order of competence in these decisions. There can be absolutely no doubt as to either the integrity or Municipal good will of this Council. You intend to do what is in the best interest of the Town. z Typically, you are presented with briefs from interested parties, including your own staff. After correct and due process, you decide what to do. When significant uncertainty remains you will, as you have in this case, seek outside advice from professionals you retain. Seeking help is a sign of mature and responsible effort to learn and do things right. It is also clear evidence that the Council and /or staff acknowledge an absence of adequate expertise in the topic area. The use of lawyers is an obvious example: the use of technical specialists such as civil engineers is another. There are many other examples. The common denominator is that the decisions you are called to make relate to the governance areas mentioned above and are generally in your area of expertise as lawmakers. The challenge in this case is to answer what appears to have been posed to you as the question: Should Vail authorize the creation and use of a private helicopter airport within the Town and if so, under what terms and governance ?" (Granted, others may word the question differently, but this captures the essential idea.) On the surface, this seems like just one more land use /bylaw decision i.e. "business as usual" decision. Somebody wants permission to do something that they argue is in their own and the Town's best interest and some other interests or residents argue the opposite. Both sides retain expert advisors to argue their case before you. You seek expertise to aid you in determining the "rights and wrongs" of the matter. But, this decision is a quantum different from that. In this case the question might more accurately be posed: 3 Should the Town of Vail place the lives of hospital patients and townspeople at risk of their lives and property in order to facilitate the creation and operation of a private helicopter airport ?" Parties will argue this way and that but the harsh truth is that helicopters are dangerous per se. It is also true that the flying conditions in Vail and region are among the most challenging that exist. Specifically, the issue of "lift" in high altitude conditions such as we have in Vail. I have attached a link in the e -mail that will provide you with some sense of the complexity involved in high altitude mountainous helicopter flying. The issues and variables are described in detail. The risk and complexity is self - evident. Both you and I have been presented with hard evidence of helicopter crashes and risks. The evidence seems clear enough, helicopters crash regularly and people on them and below them are injured or killed. Ladies and gentlemen. Crashes and dying are outcomes from which there is no return. Land uses, municipal affairs are decisions that can and frequently are reversed. The consequences of changes of mind in those instances are financial, administrative and political but they are reversible. Death is not. Thus, by definition, any decision that carries the risk of death as an outcome is essentially different from all others that do not carry that risk. Based on the biographies presented in the Town's website it appears that none of you has first hand experience or training in making life or death decisions. Neither, I presume, have you had to live the consequences of such a decision. Combat officers do; most of the rest of us are ill prepared for that reality. Thus, most of us use our experience in familiar areas and, unconsciously bend the realities and facts to suit our comfort zone and experience. We actually deny the reality. 4 What is my evidence, you ask: fair question. The Challenger 7 disaster has been studied and well documented. I have sent in a separate email that report and some related material for your use. In essence, the pressures, political, financial, and temporal on the decision makers, combined with a group psychological phenomenon termed " Groupthink" resulted in the managers ignoring the warnings in favor of the benefits of going forward. Cost /benefit shows up frequently in these "Higher order" decisions. Minds familiar with known benefits e.g. "success" of a good launch and return and unfamiliar with catastrophe and others' death opt for the "real" known while unconsciously ignoring the "unreal" harsher outcome. It is not so much a personal failing as a human condition. Jonathon Haidt's recent and pioneering book The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided By Politics scientifically documents how humans actually decide things. He tells us (with great evidence) that most times we act unconsciously and then rationalize the decision afterward. In this instance, respected Councillors, a highly conscious rational decision is called for. Haidt, a moral psychologist, instructs us that a clear intention to actually "think," and invest time and energy in clearing one's mind for that thought, are required. It is, he suggests, a higher order of thinking than normal. In the attached description of Groupthink there is a list of symptoms. It may be useful for you to carefully review those and examine if they apply to your Council and staff. It requires a very clear mind and genuine effort and, most of all, courage. WWI provides an example of Groupthink. Leaders confused the trade off between known benefits e.g. sovereignty and national pride, and the unknown reality of others' death. With hindsight, it is obvious that the politicians, well meaning as they were, had it wrong.... and were unaware of it: So too the managers of Challenger 7. W One symptom of Groupthink, is the over estimation of the group's Power and Morality. It mentions the sense of invulnerability. That notion is relevant here. Members of the Vail community have told me that it is believed that Councilors and officials would bear no personal accountability if, after approving a private airport, a helicopter were to crash causing loss of life and /or property. No doubt there are some legal and insurance protections, and these will seem to give comfort and security. But, there are numerous scenarios that challenge that assumption. Say the helicopter crashes on the hospital, the most likely crash zone, and patients are involved. Will the Town Council of the day defend its predecessors? What if the crash is in the town buildings? Councilors themselves might be injured. How strong will the support be for those that set up the scenario? After 50+ years of dealing at a senior level both commercially and politically and having managed or advised on dozens of suits of all kinds I know from experience that invulnerability is a fiction. In my opinion, authorizing the creation and operation of a private helicopter airport in Vail would be an unwise decision. Respectfully Submitted, Covell D. Brown LINKS sent in previous email: -Basic information on flying helicopters in mountainous areas - Federal Report on management errors in decision making that resulted in the Challenger 7 disaster C. ATTACHED BELOW: - Wikipedia entry on Groupthink Groupthink From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision - making outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences. Loyalty to the group requires individuals to avoid raising controversial issues or alternative solutions, and there is loss of individual creativity, uniqueness and independent thinking. The dysfunctional group dynamics of the "ingroup" produces an "illusion of invulnerability" (an inflated certainty that the right decision has been made). Thus the " ingroup" significantly overrates its own abilities in decision - making, and significantly underrates the abilities of its opponents (the "outgroup "). Furthermore groupthink can produce dehumanizing actions against the "outgroup ". Antecedent factors such as group cohesiveness, faulty group structure, and situational context (e.g., community panic) play into the likelihood of whether or not groupthink will impact the decision - making process. Groupthink is a construct of social psychology but has an extensive reach, and influences literature in the fields of communication studies, political science, management, and organizational theory,[l] as well as important aspects of deviant religious cult behaviour.[2][31 Groupthink is sometimes stated to occur (more broadly) within natural 7 groups within the community, for example to explain the lifelong different mindsets of conservatives versus liberals,[41 or the solitary nature of introverts.[5] However, this conformity of viewpoints within a group does not mainly involve deliberate group decision - making, and thus is perhaps better explained by the collective confirmation bias of the individual members of the group. Most of the initial research on groupthink was conducted by Irving Janis, a research psychologist from Yale University.[61 Janis published an influential book in 1972, which was revised in 1982.[7][81 Later studies have evaluated and reformulated his groupthink model.[g][1o] Contents [hide] 1 History 2 Symptoms 3 Causes 4 Prevention 5 Empirical findings and meta - analysis 6 Case studies 6.1 Politics and military 6.1.1 Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis 6.1.2 Pearl Harbor 6.2 Corporate world 6.2.1 Swissair 6.2.2 Marks & Spencer and British Airways 6.3 Sports 7 Recent developments 7.1 Ubiquity model 7.1.1 General group problem - solving (GGPS) model 7.2 Reexamination 7.3 Reformulation 7.4 Sociocognitive theory 8 See also 9 References 10 Further reading 11 External links S History[edit] From "Groupthink" by William H. Whyte, Jr. in Fortune magazine, March 1952 William H. Whyte, Jr. coined the term in 1952 in Fortune magazine: Groupthink being a coinage - and, admittedly, a loaded one - a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere instinctive conformity - it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity - an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well.[11][12] Irving Janis pioneered the initial research on the groupthink theory. He does not cite Whyte, but coined the term by analogy with "doublethink" and similar terms that were part of the newspeak vocabulary in the novel Nineteen Eighty -Four by George Orwell. He initially defined groupthink as follows: use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence - seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures.[6] 43 He went on to write: The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy- making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups.[6] 44 Janis set the foundation for the study of groupthink starting with his research in the American Soldier Project where he studied the effect E of extreme stress on group cohesiveness. After this study he remained interested in the ways in which people make decisions under external threats. This interest led Janis to study a number of "disasters" in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco (1961); and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964 -67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions occurred largely because of groupthink, which prevented contradictory views from being expressed and subsequently evaluated. After the publication of Janis' book Victims of Groupthink in 1972,[7] and a revised edition with the title Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes in 1982,[8] the concept of groupthink was used[ay whom?' to explain many other faulty decisions in history. These events included Nazi Germany's decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, the Watergate Scandal and others. Despite the popularity of the concept of groupthink, fewer than two dozen studies addressed the phenomenon itself following the publication of Victims of Groupthink, between the years 1972 and 1998.[1]107 This is surprising considering how many fields of interests it spans, which include political science, communications, organizational studies, social psychology, management, strategy, counseling, and marketing. One can most likely explain this lack of follow -up in that group research is difficult to conduct, groupthink has many independent and dependent variables, and it is unclear "how to translate [groupthink's] theoretical concepts into observable and quantitative constructs. "[1 ]:107 -108 Nevertheless, outside research psychology and sociology, wider culture has come to detect groupthink (somewhat fuzzily defined) in observable situations, for example: • " [...] critics of Twitter point to the predominance of the hive mind in such social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of conformity to the group, the collective "[13] • "[...] leaders often have beliefs which are very far from matching reality and which can become more extreme as they are encouraged by their followers. The predilection of many cult leaders for abstract, ambiguous, and therefore unchallengeable 10 ideas can further reduce the likelihood of reality testing, while the intense milieu control exerted by cults over their members means that most of the reality available for testing is supplied by the group environment. This is seen in the phenomenon of 'groupthink', alleged to have occurred, notoriously, during the Bay of Pigs fiasco. "[14] • "Groupthink by Compulsion [...] [G]roupthink at least implies voluntarism. When this fails, the organization is not above outright intimidation. [ ... ] In [a nationwide telecommunications company], refusal by the new hires to cheer on command incurred consequences not unlike the indoctrination and brainwashing techniques associated with a Soviet -era gulag. "[15] SymptOMS[edit] To make groupthink testable, Irving Janis devised eight symptoms indicative of groupthink. Type I: Overestimations of the group — its power and morality 1. Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking. 2. Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions. Type II: Closed- mindedness 1. Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions. 2. Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, impotent, or stupid. Type III: Pressures toward uniformity 1. Self - censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus. 2. Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement. 3. Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty" 4. Mindguards— self- appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information. Causes[edit] 11 Janis prescribed three antecedent conditions to groupthink.[7] 9 1. High group cohesiveness • deindividuation: group cohesiveness becomes more important than individual freedom of expression 2. Structural faults: • insulation of the group • lack of impartial leadership • lack of norms requiring methodological procedures • homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology 3. Situational context: • highly stressful external threats • recent failures • excessive difficulties on the decision - making task • moral dilemmas Although it is possible for a situation to contain all three of these factors, all three are not always present even when groupthink is occurring. Janis considered a high degree of cohesiveness to be the most important antecedent to producing groupthink and always present when groupthink was occurring; however, he believed high cohesiveness would not always produce groupthink. A very cohesive group abides to all group norms; whether or not groupthink arises is dependent on what the group norms are. If the group encourages individual dissent and alternative strategies to problem solving, it is likely that groupthink will be avoided even in a highly cohesive group. This means that high cohesion will lead to groupthink only if one or both of the other antecedents is present, situational context being slightly more likely than structural faults to produce groupthink.[161 Prevention[edit] As observed by Aldag & Fuller (1993), the groupthink phenomenon seems to rest on a set of unstated and generally restrictive assumptions: [17] 1. The purpose of group problem solving is mainly to improve decision quality 2. Group problem solving is considered a rational process. 3. Benefits of group problem solving: • variety of perspectives 12 • more information about possible alternatives • better decision reliability • dampening of biases • social presence effects 4. Groupthink prevents these benefits due to structural faults and provocative situational context 5. Groupthink prevention methods will produce better decisions 6. An illusion of well -being is presumed to be inherently dysfunctional. 7. Group pressures towards consensus lead to concurrence - seeking tendencies. It has been thought that groups with the strong ability to work together will be able to solve dilemmas in a quicker and more efficient fashion than an individual. Groups have a greater amount of resources which lead them to be able to store and retrieve information more readily and come up with more alternative solutions to a problem. There was a recognized downside to group problem solving in that it takes groups more time to come to a decision and requires that people make compromises with each other. However, it was not until the research of Janis appeared that anyone really considered that a highly cohesive group could impair the group's ability to generate quality decisions. Tightly -knit groups may appear to make decisions better because they can come to a consensus quickly and at a low energy cost; however, over time this process of decision making may decrease the members' ability to think critically. It is, therefore, considered by many to be important to combat the effects of groupthink.[161 According to Janis, decision making groups are not necessarily destined to groupthink. He devised ways of preventing g ro u pth i n k: [7].2 °9 -Z1 5 1. Leaders should assign each member the role of "critical evaluator ". This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts. 2. Leaders should not express an opinion when assigning a task to a group. 3. Leaders should absent themselves from many of the group meetings to avoid excessively influencing the outcome. 4. The organization should set up several independent groups, 13 working on the same problem. 5. All effective alternatives should be examined. 6. Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outside of the group. 7. The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts. 8. At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil's advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting. By following these guidelines, groupthink can be avoided. After the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to avoid groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis using "vigilant appraisal. "[8]'148 -153 During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed group members to question them carefully. He also encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their separate departments, and he even divided the group up into various sub - groups, to partially break the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his own opinion. Empirical findings and meta- analysis[edit] Testing groupthink in a laboratory is difficult because synthetic settings remove groups from real social situations, which ultimately changes the variables conducive or inhibitive to groupthink.[18] Because of its subjective nature, researchers have struggled to measure groupthink as a complete phenomenon, instead frequently opting to measure its particular factors. These factors range from causal to effectual and focus on group and situational aspects. [19][201 Park (1990) found that "only 16 empirical studies have been published on groupthink," and concluded that they "resulted in only partial support of his [Janis's] hypotheses. "[21]230 Park concludes, "despite Janis' claim that group cohesiveness is the major necessary antecedent factor, no research has showed a significant main effect of cohesiveness on groupthink. "[21]230 Park also concludes that research on the interaction between group cohesiveness and leadership style does not support Janis' claim that cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink symptoms.[21] Park presents a summary of the results of the studies analyzed. According 14 to Park, a study by Huseman and Drive (1979) indicates groupthink occurs in both small and large decision making groups within businesses.[21] This results partly from group isolation within the business. Manz and Sims (1982) conducted a study showing that autonomous work groups are susceptible to groupthink symptoms in the same manner as decisions making groups within businesses.[21][221 Fodor and Smith (1982) produced a study revealing that group leaders with high power motivation create atmospheres more susceptible to groupthink.[21][231 Leaders with high power motivation possess characteristics similar to leaders with a "closed" leadership style —an unwillingness to respect dissenting opinion. The same study indicates that level of group cohesiveness is insignificant in predicting groupthink occurrence. Park summarizes a study performed by Callaway, Marriot, and Esser (1985) in which groups with highly dominant members "made higher quality decisions, exhibited lowered state of anxiety, took more time to reach a decision, and made more statements of disagreement /agreement. "[21]:232[24] Overall, groups with highly dominant members expressed characteristics inhibitory to groupthink. If highly dominant members are considered equivalent to leaders with high power motivation, the results of Callaway, Marriot, and Esser contradict the results of Fodor and Smith. A study by Leana (1985) indicates the interaction between level of group cohesion and leadership style is completely insignificant in predicting groupthink.[21][25] This finding refutes Janis' claim that the factors of cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink. Park summarizes a study by McCauley (1989) in which structural conditions of the group were found to predict groupthink while situational conditions did not.[101[21] The structural conditions included group insulation, group homogeneity, and promotional leadership. The situational conditions included group cohesion. These findings refute Janis' claim about group cohesiveness predicting groupthink. Overall, studies on groupthink have largely focused on the factors (antecedents) that predict groupthink. Groupthink occurrence is often measured by number of ideas /solutions generated within a group, but there is no uniform, concrete standard by which researchers can objectively conclude groupthink occurs.[18] The studies of groupthink and groupthink antecedents reveal a mixed body of results. Some studies indicate group cohesion and leadership style to be powerfully 15 predictive of groupthink, while other studies indicate the insignificance of these factors. Group homogeneity and group insulation are generally supported as factors predictive of groupthink. Case studies[edit] Politics and military[edit] Groupthink can have a strong hold on political decisions and military operations, which may result in enormous wastage of human and material resources. Highly qualified and experienced politicians and military commanders sometimes make very poor decisions when in a suboptimal group setting. Scholars such as Janis and Raven attribute political and military fiascoes, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, to the effect of groupthink.[8][26] More recently, Dina Badie argued that groupthink was largely responsible for the shift in the U.S. administration's view on Saddam Hussein that eventually led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States.[27] After 9/11, "stress, promotional leadership, and intergroup conflict" were all factors that gave rise to the occurrence of groupthink.[27] 283 Political case studies of groupthink serve to illustrate the impact that the occurrence of groupthink can have in today's political scene. Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis[edit] The United States Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961 was the primary case study that Janis used to formulate his theory of groupthink.[6] The invasion plan was initiated by the Eisenhower administration, but when the Kennedy White House took over, it "uncritically accepted" the CIA's plan.[6]44 When some people, such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Senator J. William Fulbright, attempted to present their objections to the plan, the Kennedy team as a whole ignored these objections and kept believing in the morality of their plan.[6]46 Eventually Schlesinger minimized his own doubts, performing self- censorship.[6] 74 The Kennedy team stereotyped Castro and the Cubans by failing to question the CIA about its many false assumptions, including the ineffectiveness of Castro's air force, the weakness of Castro's army, and the inability of Castro to quell internal uprisings.[6]46 Janis claimed the fiasco that ensued could have been prevented if the Kennedy administration had followed the methods to preventing 16 groupthink adopted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which took place just one year later in October 1962. In the latter crisis, essentially the same political leaders were involved in decision - making, but this time they learned from their previous mistake of seriously under - rating their opponents.[6] 76 Pearl Harbor[edit] The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 is a prime example of groupthink. A number of factors such as shared illusions and rationalizations contributed to the lack of precaution taken by Naval officers based in Hawaii. The United States had intercepted Japanese messages and they discovered that Japan was arming itself for an offensive attack somewhere in the Pacific. Washington took action by warning officers stationed at Pearl Harbor, but their warning was not taken seriously. They assumed that Japan was taking measures in the event that their embassies and consulates in enemy territories were usurped. The Navy and Army in Pearl Harbor also shared rationalizations about why an attack was unlikely. Some of them included:[$] 83,85 • "The Japanese would never dare attempt a full -scale surprise assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all -out war, which the United States would surely win." • "The Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl Harbor was a major deterrent against air or naval attack." • "Even if the Japanese were foolhardy to send their carriers to attack us [the United States], we could certainly detect and destroy them in plenty of time." • "No warships anchored in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor could ever be sunk by torpedo bombs launched from enemy aircraft." Corporate world[edit] In the corporate world, ineffective and suboptimal group decision - making can negatively affect the health of a company and cause a considerable amount of monetary loss. Swissair[edit] Aaron Hermann and Hussain Rammal illustrate the detrimental role of groupthink in the collapse of Swissair, a Swiss airline company that was thought to be so financially stable that it earned the title the "Flying Bank. "[28] The authors argue that, among other factors, 17 Swissair carried two symptoms of groupthink: the belief that the group is invulnerable and the belief in the morality of the group.[28] 1056 In addition, before the fiasco, the size of the company board was reduced, subsequently eliminating industrial expertise. This may have further increased the likelihood of groupthink.[28] 1055 With the board members lacking expertise in the field and having somewhat similar background, norms, and values, the pressure to conform may have become more prominent. [281:' 057 This phenomenon is called group homogeneity, which is an antecedent to groupthink. Together, these conditions may have contributed to the poor decision - making process that eventually led to Swissair's collapse. Marks & Spencer and British Airways[edit] Another example of groupthink from the corporate world is illustrated in the UK based companies, Marks & Spencer and British Airways. The negative impact of groupthink took place during the 1990s as both companies released globalization expansion strategies. Researcher Jack Eaton's content analysis of media press releases revealed that all eight symptoms of groupthink were present during this period. The most predominant symptom of groupthink was the illusion of invulnerability as both companies underestimated potential failure due to years of profitability and success during challenging markets. Up until the consequence of groupthink erupted they were considered blue chips and darlings of the London Stock Exchange. During 1998 - 1999 the price of Marks & Spencer shares fell from 590 to less than 300 and that of British Airways from 740 to 300. Both companies had already featured prominently in the UK press and media for more positive reasons, to do with national pride in their undoubted sector -wide performance. [291 Sports[edit] Recent literature of groupthink attempts to study the application of this concept beyond the framework of business and politics. One particularly relevant and popular arena in which groupthink is rarely studied is sports. The lack of literature in this area prompted Charles Koerber and Christopher Neck to begin a case -study investigation that examined the effect of groupthink on the decision of the Major League Umpires Association (MLUA) to stage a mass resignation in 1999. The decision was a failed attempt to gain a stronger negotiating stance against Major League Baseball.[30] 21 Koerber and Neck suggest that three groupthink symptoms can be found in the decision- Se making process of the MLUA. First, the umpires overestimated the power that they had over the baseball league and the strength of their group's resolve. The union also exhibited some degree of closed - mindedness with the notion that MLB is the enemy. Lastly, there was the presence of self- censorship; some umpires who disagreed with the decision to resign failed to voice their dissent.[30] 25 These factors, along with other decision - making defects, led to a decision that was suboptimal and ineffective. Recent developments[edit] Ubiquity model[edit] Researcher Robert Baron (2005) contends that the connection between certain antecedents Janis believed necessary have not been demonstrated by the current collective body of research on groupthink. He believes that Janis' antecedents for groupthink is incorrect and argues that not only are they "not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but that they often will not even amplify such symptoms. "[31] As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink. This model provides a revised set of antecedents for groupthink, including social identification, salient norms, and low self- efficacy. General group problem - solving (GGPS) model[edit] Aldag and Fuller (1993) argue that the groupthink concept was based on a "small and relatively restricted sample" that became too broadly general ized.[171 Furthermore, the concept is too rigidly staged and deterministic. Empirical support for it has also not been consistent. The authors compare groupthink model to findings presented by Maslow and Piaget; they argue that, in each case, the model incites great interest and further research that, subsequently, invalidate the original concept. Aldag and Fuller thus suggest a new model called the general group problem - solving (GGPS) model, which integrates new findings from groupthink literature and alters aspects of groupthink itself.[17] 534 The primary difference between the GGPS model and groupthink is that the former is more value neutral and more political.[17]544 Reexamination [edit] Other scholars attempt to assess the merit of groupthink by reexamining case studies that Janis had originally used to buttress 19 his model. Roderick Kramer (1998) believed that, because scholars today have a more sophisticated set of ideas about the general decision - making process and because new and relevant information about the fiascos have surfaced over the years, a reexamination of the case studies is appropriate and necessary.[32] He argues that new evidence does not support Janis' view that groupthink was largely responsible for President Kennedy's and President Johnson's decisions in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and U.S. escalated military involvement in the Vietnam War, respectively. Both presidents sought the advice of experts outside of their political groups more than Janis suggested.[32] 241 Kramer also argues that the presidents were the final decision - makers of the fiascos; while determining which course of action to take, they relied more heavily on their own construals of the situations than on any group- consenting decision presented to them.[32] 241 Kramer concludes that Janis' explanation of the two military issues is flawed and that groupthink has much less influence on group decision - making than is popularly believed to be. Reformulation[edit] Whyte (1998) suggests that collective efficacy plays a large role in groupthink because it causes groups to become less vigilant and to favor risks, two particular factors that characterize groups affected by groupthink.[33] McCauley recasts aspects of groupthink's preconditions by arguing that the level of attractiveness of group members is the most prominent factor in causing poor decision - making.[34] The results of Turner's and Pratkanis' (1991) study on social identity maintenance perspective and groupthink conclude that groupthink can be viewed as a "collective effort directed at warding off potentially negative views of the group. "[3] Together, the contributions of these scholars have brought about new understandings of groupthink that help reformulate Janis' original model. Sociocognitive theory[edit] According to a new theory many of the basic characteristics of groupthink - e.g., strong cohesion, indulgent atmosphere, and exclusive ethos - are the result of a special kind of mnemonic encoding (Tsoukalas, 2007). Members of tightly knit groups have a tendency to represent significant aspects of their community as episodic memories and this has a predictable influence on their group behavior and collective ideology.[35]